The effects of entry regulation on bank competition: The case of the Iranian banking industry

Nasser Khiabani and Mehdi Hamidisahneh
Additional contact information
Mehdi Hamidisahneh: Carlos III University of Madrid
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mehdi Hamidi Sahneh ()

Journal of Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 15, 119-137

Abstract: We focus on a modified version of the markup test to investigate the impact of entry regulation on competitive conditions in the Iranian banking industry for the period 1996-2006. The time interval under examination corresponds to an era characterized by substantial relaxation of entry barriers and private bank penetration. To estimate Lerner indexes as a measure of bank competition, we set up a simultaneous equation model for unbalanced panel data by utilizing the stepwise maximum likelihood method. We find that concomitantly with the new bank entries a pro-competitive change in the banking industry took place.

Keywords: bank competition; Lerner index; entry regulation; unbalanced panel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D43 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/volume15/khiabani.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Effects of Entry Regulation on Bank Competition: The Case of the Iranian Banking Industry (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:15:y:2012:n:1:p:119-137

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Applied Economics is currently edited by Germán Coloma and Mariana Conte Grand and Jorge M. Streb

More articles in Journal of Applied Economics from Universidad del CEMA Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Valeria Dowding ().