 National electoral cycles in transfers to subnational jurisdictions. Evidence from ArgentinaJournal of Applied Economics, 2014, vol. 17, 161-178 Abstract: The political budget cycle literature studies the periodic fluctuations in governments’ fiscal policies induced by the cyclicality of electoral processes, but the effects of elections on the distribution of federal resources among subnational governments has not been thoroughly investigated. This paper inquires into the presence of electoral cycles in federal government transfers, presenting evidence on how the Argentine national government has allocated, since the reestablishment of democracy in 1983, two different types of discretional transfers — cash and in-kind — among the subnational governments. There is an electoral manipulation of total transfers that favors subnational governments that are politically affiliated to the national government; cash transfers show that same pattern. However, inkind transfers, which are more traceable to the national government than cash transfers, increase in non-affiliated subnational jurisdictions during election years. Keywords: electoral cycles; subnational governments (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:17:y:2014:n:1:p:161-178 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Applied Economics is currently edited by Germán Coloma and Mariana Conte Grand and Jorge M. Streb More articles in Journal of Applied Economics from Universidad del CEMA Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to econpapers@oru.se.
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.