Plugged in brokers: A model of vote-buying and access to resources

Rodrigo Zarazaga S.J.
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Rodrigo Zarazaga S.J.: CIAS - Centro de Investigación y Acción Social

Journal of Applied Economics, 2015, vol. 18, 369-390

Abstract: Available formal models portray brokers as exploitative agents who buy their clients at the minimum possible price; that is, at voters’ reservation values. If this were the case then we should expect that poor voters be indifferent as to which broker they deal with, since they could expect the same minimum price from any broker. On the contrary, evidence of longterm broker-client relationships suggests that clients do care about who their broker is. The formal model in this paper, in correspondence with evidence drawn from 120 interviews with brokers, illuminates the reason why clients care about who their brokers are. Brokers are uncertain about voters’ reservation values. Due to this uncertainty, the more resources brokers obtain, the more they transfer to clients to assure their votes. Given this uncertainty over reservation values, voters benefit from brokers’ abilities to access more resources. These dynamics account for party machines’ frequent electoral hegemony.

Keywords: vote-buying; clientelism; party machines; reputation; brokers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O17 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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https://ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/volume18/Zarazaga_appendix.pdf Online Appendix (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:18:y:2015:n:2:p:369-390

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