Optimal Opt-in "Climate" Contracts

Juan-Pablo Montero

Journal of Applied Economics, 1998, vol. 1, 363-384

Abstract: The paper studies the design of a treadable permit system with opt-in possibilities for LDCs countries in the context of climate change. In setting the optimal opt-in rule, the regulator faces a trade-off between production efficiency (minimization of control costs) and information rent extraction (reduction of excess permits). Results from simulation exercises based on data from MIT´s EPPA Model are also provided.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:1:y:1998:n:2:p:363-384

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