Ownership concentration, market monitoring and performance: Evidence from the UK, the Czech Republic and Poland

Vahe Lskavyan () and Mariana Spatareanu

Journal of Applied Economics, 2006, vol. 9, 91-104

Abstract: Using data for publicly traded companies from the UK and two transition countries, the Czech Republic and Poland, we analyze the relationship between ownership concentratio and performance while also accounting for the effect of hostile takeover threats on this relationship. Some argue that ownership concentration will improve performance by making the owners more willing or able to monitor managers. Others argue that in the presence of efficient markets, market monitoring (via the threat of hostile takeovers) will discipline the managers. Our results show that concentration is insignificant in explaining performance both in the transition countries, where market monitoring is supposedly weak, and in the UK, where market monitoring is supposedly strong.

Keywords: Ownership concentration; markets for corporate control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/volume9/lskavyan.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:9:y:2006:n:1:p:91-104

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Applied Economics is currently edited by Germán Coloma and Mariana Conte Grand and Jorge M. Streb

More articles in Journal of Applied Economics from Universidad del CEMA Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Valeria Dowding ().