Chapter 4: US Precedents for Europe

Giuseppe Bertola, Edward Driffill (), Harold James, Hans-Werner Sinn, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Akos Valentinyi ()

EEAG Report on the European Economy, 2013, 95-107

Abstract: This chapter investigates two of the most widely debated aspects of US fiscal and financial integration: (1) the responsibility of the federation for state-level debts and for the creditworthiness of states; and (2) the working of a federal central bank. Today’s fiscal federalism in the United States is relatively robust, but the road from 1790 was rocky; and the first two decades of the Federal Reserve as rife with monetary mistakes as the first fifteen years of the European Central Bank.

Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:eeagre:v::y:2013:i::p:95-107

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