Is penalty for academic cheating an incredible threat?
Supanika Leurcharusmee ()
Additional contact information
Supanika Leurcharusmee: Chiang Mai University
The Empirical Econometrics and Quantitative Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 1, issue 2, 81-96
Abstract:
Despite the severe penalty, multiple studies revealed that academic dishonesty among undergraduate students has been a chronic problem. This contradicts Becker Proposition that states that the most efficient mean to deter crime is to impose the severest penalty with the lowest probability. This study proposes an explanation for Becker Paradox in academic dishonesty. When the penalty is severe, teachers are more likely to feel empathy and choose not to report the dishonest students. This would make the severe penalty an incredible threat and does not effectively deter dishonest behavior. Consistent with the hypothesis, the results showed a strong negative relationship between the severity of penalty and the probability to report cheating. In addition, the study also found a strong positive relationship between the present of evidence and the probability to report cheating.
Keywords: Academic cheating; Becker paradox; Empathy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jyoungeconomist.com/images/stories/EEQEL_V1_N2_June_2012_Supanika.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chi:journl:v:1:y:2012:i:2:p:81-96
Access Statistics for this article
The Empirical Econometrics and Quantitative Economics Letters is currently edited by Komsan Suriya
More articles in The Empirical Econometrics and Quantitative Economics Letters from Faculty of Economics, Chiang Mai University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Komsan Suriya ().