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Financial Regulation in the Crisis Regulation, Market Discipline, Internal Control: the Big Three in Turmoil

Jézabel Couppey-Soubeyran

International Economics, 2010, issue 123, 13–29

Abstract: The financial crisis has revealed the dysfunction of all banking and financial regulatory mechanisms. Prudential regulation failed to prevent the meltdown. Market discipline neglected to send any warning signals. Internal control was seriously undermined by doubtful dealings, in France as elsewhere. Does the crisis call the big three into question? No regulation mechanism is omniscient, whether it be state, market or self-regulation. As such, none of three can operate without the other two, with the corollary that they can only function together. It means that splitting up the big three can therefore not be the answer to the crisis. By contrast, since each one of them has shown its weaknesses, the only solution is to work on reinforcing each one. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the reforms go far enough.

Keywords: Prudential supervision; Market discipline; Internal control; Financial regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G18 G21 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Financial Regulation in the Crisis Regulation, Market Discipline, Internal Control: The Big Three in turmoil (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Financial Regulation in the Crisis Regulation, Market Discipline, Internal Control: The Big Three in turmoil (2010) Downloads
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