Emergence of a New Regulation: Informational Disclosure Modalities in the Hedge Fund Opacity World

Sandra Rigot and Yamina Tadjeddine

International Economics, 2010, issue 123, 161–195

Abstract: The 2007-2008 crisis has highlighted the tensions related to lack of transparency and asymmetrical information in the hedge fund industry. Damage can be estimated at a micro level by a misallocation induced by a double (ex ante and ex post) asymmetry and at a macro level by increasing financial and banking instability. One way to resolve market failures is to require hedge funds to disclose more information, but information can be revealed in different ways. We propose an original typology of disclosure modalities by distinguishing the aim of informational disclosure (macro/ micro allocation) and the modality (by free bargaining, by a standardized contract, by an obligation toward the regulatory authorities, by publicity). We use Kohonen maps to classify issued proposals and reports. We define two typologies: one of informational disclosure modalities and of financial regulation policy.

Keywords: Informational asymmetry; Disclosure; Financial regulation; Hedge funds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 G23 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cii:cepiie:2010-q3-123-7

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