The Multicontract Organization

Jean Tirole

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1988, vol. 21, issue 3, 459-66

Abstract: This paper starts by discussing some nonstandard issues in organization theory: bou nded rationality; incomplete contracting; and collusive behavior, on which the rest of the paper focuses. It then contrasts the comprehens ive contracting and game theoretic approaches to collusion, and it li sts tentative conclusions and some unresolved issues.

Date: 1988
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