The Role of Negotiators in Union-Firm Bargaining

Stephen Jones ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1989, vol. 22, issue 3, 630-42

Abstract: Differences between the objectives of union leaders and those of the rank and file have traditionally been thought the result of political processes or irrationality. This paper shows that such differences will naturally arise as part of a rational bargaining strategy, since delegation of authority to a negotiator permits the union members to achieve advantageous commitment. This use of negotiators leads to revised interpretation of many popular theories of wage and employment determination, such as the efficient bargain and the right-to-manage models, and has implications for the interpretation of econometric modeling of union behavior.

Date: 1989
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