On the Uniqueness of Endogenous Strategic Timing

Arthur Robson

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1989, vol. 22, issue 4, 917-21

Abstract: This paper investigates conditions ensuring uniqueness of the pattern of endogenous strategic timing. A given normal form game, G, is embedded in an extensive form game, H, possessing two explicit periods. Choice of the earlier time is costlier than is choice of the later. With two players, the results here reinforce the validity of an approach due to D'Aspremont and G$8Erard-Varet (1980). With three players, however, an example demonstrates that H can have another completely distinct equilibrium from that defined by these two authors. This new equilibrium involves two "leaders" and a single "follower."

Date: 1989
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