On Why Voluntary Export Restraints Are Voluntary
Canadian Journal of Economics, 1991, vol. 24, issue 1, 228-33
This paper reexamines why voluntary export restraints are voluntary. It is shown that the results depend crucially on whether domestic goods and imports are regarded as strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This, in turn, depends on the following conditions: the form of the demand and the cost functions, and the nature of quantity competition. In particular, with linear demands and constant marginal costs, voluntary export restraints are voluntary; they are not involuntary.
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