Pollution Taxes, Subsidies, and Rent Seeking

Jean-Luc Migue and Richard Marceau

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 26, issue 2, 355-65

Abstract: In assessing the impact of pollution taxes and subsidies against the reference grid of a Coasean system of property rights assignment, the authors show that both policy tools give rise to rent seeking and nonoptimal results. In contrast to the conventional analysis of environment policy, congestion, entry by subsidized polluters, political competition for a share of the general public fund, and migration to regions endowed in environmental resources are seen as sources of rent dissipation to be subtracted from the welfare gain of pollution-control policies.

Date: 1993
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