A Welfare Comparison between VERS and Tariffs under the GATT
Michael Moore and
Steven Suranovic ()
Canadian Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 26, issue 2, 447-56
Economic theory suggests that tariffs are welfare-superior to voluntary export restraints in the presence of perfect competition. However, with perfectly competitive markets, some authors have found that voluntary export restraints may be welfare superior to tariffs. The authors reconsider the comparison between a voluntary export restraint and a tariff in the context of GATT-based constraints. Using a model of perfect competition, the authors show that a voluntary export restraint can welfare-dominate a tariff increase that is accompanied by a compensatory reduction in the tariff on another good or if the tariff is matched with a retaliatory tariff on domestic exports.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%2819930 ... WCBVA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O (text/html)
only available to JSTOR subscribers
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:26:y:1993:i:2:p:447-56
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php
Access Statistics for this article
Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Katherine Cuff
More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().