TRIPS, Trade, and Technology Transfer

M. Scott Taylor

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 26, issue 3, 625-37

Abstract: A North-South model of unintentional technology transfer is developed where the stringency of Southern patent protection provides the institutional backdrop for a strategic game in a high-tech goods market. The appropriability regime is set endogenously and combines elements of imperfect Southern patent protection with the protection afforded by market-made Northern technology 'masking.' Less stringent protection of Northern intellectual property can 'work' much like other strategic trade policies; therefore, developed countries appear to be right in demanding discussion of intellectual property rights in GATT.

Date: 1993
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