Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints

Neil Bjorksten

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1994, vol. 27, issue 2, 446-57

Abstract: In a three-country generalization of the Kreps-Scheinkman (1983) duopoly model with price competition and capacity constraints, the author analyzes the effects of discriminatory voluntary import expansions and voluntary export restraints on equilibrium capacity and pricing decisions. Voluntary export restraints are shown to be bad for the exporting country, contradicting recent results in the literature by R. Harris (1985) and K. Krishna (1989). Voluntary import expansions are shown to decrease competition. Cases are analyzed where voluntary import expansions may actually lead to import contraction or to increases in efficiency in the home country.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%2819940 ... IEAVE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V (text/html)
only available to JSTOR subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:27:y:1994:i:2:p:446-57

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().