On Some Recent Results in Incomplete Information Implementation

James Bergin

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, vol. 28, issue 1, 108-38

Abstract: This paper provides a review of some recent results on implementation in incomplete information environments. This literature is concerned with characterizing the class of social choice functions that can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of appropriately constructed games. Different game forms (normal and extensive forms) and different equilibrium concepts (Nash equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, etc.) lead to different characterizations. The discussion focuses on the key difficulties that arise in implementing social choice functions in incomplete information environments and describes some of the alternative characterizations.

Date: 1995
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