Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information
W. Bentley Macleod and
James Malcomson ()
Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, vol. 28, issue 2, 336-67
This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues, such as the appropriate game form, existence, and uniqueness of equilibria, are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.
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