Strategic Policies Towards International Factor Movement

Leonard K. Cheng and Kar-Yiu Wong

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1997, vol. 30, issue 2, 456-78

Abstract: In this paper, the authors analyze the optimal policies of two active countries toward international movement of both labor and capital in a two-stage noncooperative game. They show that a complete buyout of both factors by either country can never be a Nash equilibrium, although a partial buyout is possible. Furthermore, in equilibrium the 'large' country tends either to remain virtually passive or to play along with the 'small' country, whereas the small country adopts more significant policies.

Date: 1997
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