Durable Services Monopolists Do Better Than Durable Goods Monopolists

John Spicer and Dan Bernhardt

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1997, vol. 30, issue 4, 975-90

Abstract: The authors consider a monopolist who can commit to a price path when selling a good for which individual consumers demand at most one unit. Only if the monopolist can also commit to destroying unpurchased stock and the timing of stock release, can she earn more than a static monopolist. This additional commitment power has empirical revelance for a wide range of goods that the authors term 'durable services.' The inability to store output facilitates price discrimination by a durable services monopolist by permitting the credible threat of rationing. The authors detail sufficient conditions for a durable services monopolist to produce more than a static or durable goods monopolist produces.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:30:y:1997:i:4:p:975-90

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().