Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling: The Case of Correlated Private Valuations

Ruqu Wang ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1998, vol. 31, issue 2, 395-410

Abstract: Two popular selling methods are compared in a one-period correlated private-values model. The seller of an object has to decide whether to sell it by posting a fixed price or by an auction. Without auctioning costs, an auction (with a reserve price) is always preferable. With positive auctioning costs, the authors find that an auction is still preferable when the distribution of buyers' valuations is sufficiently dispersed or when the object value is sufficiently high. The relations between these and previous results are also discussed.

JEL-codes: D40 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%2819980 ... VPSTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8 (text/html)
only available to JSTOR subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:31:y:1998:i:2:p:395-410

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().