Why Do Southern Countries Have Little Incentive to Protect Northern Intellectual Property Rights?
Yong Yang
Canadian Journal of Economics, 1998, vol. 31, issue 4, 800-816
Abstract:
Instead of focusing on the conflict of interests between North and South, the author studies the conflict of interests among southern countries and provides an alternative answer to the question: why do southern countries have little incentive to protect northern intellectual property rights? Owing to the incentive of each southern country to free-ride on other southern countries with respect to providing protection, the overall protection they provide is not sufficient. Therefore, a new source of mutual gains exists among southern countries and also between North and South. A joint effort of southern countries is required to exploit these gains.
JEL-codes: F02 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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