Evasive Ability and the Efficiency Cost of the Underground Economy

Filip Palda

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1998, vol. 31, issue 5, 1118-1138

Abstract: In the presence of differing abilities to evade taxes, markets select producers for their evasive skills and their abilities to keep costs of production low. Inefficient firms crowd out efficient firms. If the least efficient firms are the best tax evaders, adverse selection is severe and output comes entirely from the high cost end of the supply curve. Tax revenue may be greater under tax evasion than without evasion if evasive ability allows government to act as a price-discriminating monopolist. When evasive and productive talents are unrelated this result disappears, but the deadweight loss due to adverse selection of firms persists and rivals the size of the traditional triangle deadweight loss.

JEL-codes: H26 H43 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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