Tradition and Common Property Management

Matthew Turner

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1999, vol. 32, issue 3, 673-687

Abstract: Since management of a common property resource can be undertaken only by a government of finitely lived agents, studying the behavior of such governments is a natural way to study common property management. The author proposes that we regard the choice of management objective by such a government as a 'move' in a game of sequential agents. Given this framework, it is shown that subgame perfect equilibria exist in which successive governments choose the same 'traditional' management objective. These strategies enable an economy to overcome any intergenerational externality. Thus, following a tradition of conservation may be a rational response to an intergenerational externality.

Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Tradition and Common Property Management (1998)
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