Strategic Trade and Competition Policies to Assist Distressed Industries

Theresa Greaney

Canadian Journal of Economics, 1999, vol. 32, issue 3, 767-784

Abstract: A country's unilateral incentive to use strategic trade policies typically conflicts with multilateral interests regarding such intervention. The author demonstrates that domestic and world interests can coincide if intervention is used to deter exit from a distressed domestic industry. In particular, a policy of government-endorsed collusion between domestic firms can improve domestic welfare while avoiding the usual beggar-thy-neighbor effects associated with the use of trade policies; it also may offer a more incentive-compatible means of assisting distressed domestic firms, since a unilateral incentive to intervene exists only where the viability of the firms is threatened.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%281999 ... TACPT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A (text/html)
only available to JSTOR subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:3:p:767-784

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().