The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance?

Carlo Perroni and John Whalley

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 33, issue 1, 1-24

Abstract: Several of the recently negotiated regional trade agreements contain significantly fewer concessions by the large countries to smaller countries than vice versa. In this paper, we compute post-retaliation Nash tariffs by region under various regional trade arrangements using a calibrated numerical general equilibrium model of world trade. Regional agreements constrain strategic behaviour within each trading area, and (in the Customs Union case) enhance it outside the bloc. Results confirm the intuition that without side payments large-small country regional agreements (such as the Canada-U.S. agreement) would not have occurred.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (60)

Downloads: (external link)
https://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%282000 ... NRTLO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7 (text/html)
only available to JSTOR subscribers

Related works:
Journal Article: The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance? (2000)
Working Paper: The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization or Insurance? (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:1:p:1-24

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().