Union bargaining power, relative wages, and efficiency in Canada

Timothy Fisher and Robert Waschik

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 33, issue 3, 742-765

Abstract: We use a computable general equilibrium model incorporating trade unions, efficient Nash contracts, existing distortions, and international trade to measure the deadweight loss in Canada arising from the ability of unions to raise wages above competitive levels. The model incorporates two features new to CGE analysis: parameterization of union bargaining power and variations in union preferences. Estimates indicate the deadweight loss to be no more than 0.04 per cent of GNP. However, the small aggregate effect masks considerable adjustments at the industry level, in imports and exports, and in the distribution of income. Adjustments are also larger with employment-oriented unions.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%282000 ... BPRWA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 (text/html)
only available to JSTOR subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:3:p:742-765

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().