Leadership selection, internal promotion, and bureaucratic corruption in less developed polities

James Rauch

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 34, issue 1, 240-258

Abstract: The establishment of a professional government bureaucracy in place of political appointees is an important component of an enabling environment for private enterprise. I show that internal promotion can help to bring to power individuals who highly value (relative to income) imposition of their preferences over collective goods on the public. Such individuals restrain the corruption of their subordinates as a byproduct of their efforts to implement their preferences using tax revenue. As a result, large-scale and petty corruption tend to move together and both tend to be lower the longer the practice of internal promotion has been in place.

JEL-codes: D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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