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Inflation, taxes, and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken

Richard Barnett ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 34, issue 1, 82-99

Abstract: In this study some of the consequences of an uncertain policy struggle ("game of chicken") between independent taxing agencies (a monetary and a fiscal authority) are examined. We show that policy uncertainty may improve upon regimes where there is no uncertainty and one agency succeeds in implementing a low-tax policy at the expense of the other agency. An uncertain tax policy never dominates a fully coordinated tax policy, but it can move average tax rates in the right direction. In this sense, the game of chicken between agencies can be beneficial and can compensate for the lack of a specific coordinating administration. (

JEL-codes: E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:82-99