A model of evidence production and optimal standard of proof and penalty in criminal trials

Okan Yilankaya

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2002, vol. 35, issue 2, 385-409

Abstract: The defendant is either innocent or guilty, which she, not the court or prosecutor, knows. The court convicts the defendant whenever its posterior probability of her guilt - which depends on the evidence presented - is greater than . Evidence production by litigating parties is a costly stochastic process. Subsequently, the optimal choice of standard of proof and penalty is analysed. The optimal standard of proof is increasing in the cost of convicting an innocent defendant and decreasing in the cost of acquitting a guilty defendant. Higher penalties may increase probabilities of false conviction false acquittal.

Date: 2002
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