Joint tax evasion
Robin Boadway (),
Nicolas Marceau () and
Steeve Mongrain ()
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2002, vol. 35, issue 3, 417-435
Tax evasion analysis typically assumes that evasion involves individual taxpayers responding to some given policies. However, evading taxes could require the collaboration of at least two taxpayers. Detection depends on the costly avoidance activities of both transacting partners. An increase in sanctions leads to a direct increase in the expected cost of a transaction in the illegal sector, but it may also increase the incentive for the partners to cooperate in avoiding detection. The total cost of transacting in the illegal sector can fall, and tax evasion may increase. The policy implications of this phenomenon are considered.
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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