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Rationalized subjective equilibria in repeated games

Oishi Hidetsugu

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2003, vol. 36, issue 1, 168-191

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide a new equilibrium concept of repeated games that involve incomplete information ( ) and a related framework ( ), and to analyse the relationships between players' subjective images of games and the realized outcomes. We demonstrate the relationships among rationalized subjective equilibria, subjective equilibria, and original Nash equilibria by providing several examples. We also present several theorems analogous to the ordinary folk theorem and a simple application using the Cournot duopoly model.

JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:36:y:2003:i:1:p:168-191