Antidumping law as a collusive device
Maurizio Zanardi ()
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, vol. 37, issue 1, 95-122
In the United States many antidumping petitions are withdrawn before the investigations are completed. Prusa (1992) argues that petitions are used by domestic industries to induce foreign industries into collusive agreements. In his model, all antidumping petitions should be withdrawn, which is not the case. This paper provides a model in which only some petitions are withdrawn. Withdrawal depends on two key parameters: coordination cost and bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries. A new data set is constructed to test the model on the U.S. experience for the period 1980-97. The econometric analysis supports the theoretical conclusions of the model.
JEL-codes: F13 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v37n1/05.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Available to subscribers only. Alternative access through JSTOR and Ingenta.
Working Paper: Antidumping law as a collusive device (2004)
Working Paper: Antidumping Law as a Collusive Device (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:37:y:2004:i:1:p:95-122
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Katherine Cuff
More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .