Direct sale of information when precision is unobservable

Saltuk Ozerturk

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2004, vol. 37, issue 2, 269-293

Abstract: This paper studies the incentives of an information seller to provide precise information when precision is not observable and investors with rational expectations can extract information from the equilibrium asset price. I show that the seller can verify her precision by employing a non-linear contract. I derive the equilibrium fee for information as a function of the seller's incentives, the sales volume, and buyers' trading intensity. I also analyse the implications of allowing the seller to trade on her own account for truthfulness and precision choice.

JEL-codes: D42 G11 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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