Ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment

Benoit Julien, John Kennes and Ian King

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 38, issue 1, 174-193

Abstract: We study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non-cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite-sized markets where the equilibrium-matching process has decreasing returns to scale - where the `Hosios rule' does not apply - both with and without heterogeneity.

JEL-codes: D83 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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