Antidumping protection and R&D competition

Xiwang Gao and Kaz Miyagiwa ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 38, issue 1, 211-227

Abstract: In recent years antidumping protection has spread throughout the world. Evidence shows that antidumping often targets R&D-intensive sectors, raising a concern that it may adversely affect worldwide investments in R&D. We investigate this issue in a model of reciprocal dumping extended to a two-stage game, in which two firms first choose R&D levels and then compete in prices. We find that, when a single government institutes antidumping law, the protected firm decreases investment in R&D, while the constrained firm invests more. When both governments engage in antidumping actions, both firms invest more in R&D than under free trade.

JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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