Product standards, trade disputes, and protectionism

Daniel Sturm

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 39, issue 2, 564-581

Abstract: Disputes over national product standards are a major source of tension in international trade negotiations. The usual pattern is that exporters challenge new product standards as a `disguised barrier to trade.' The paper develops a two-country political agency model of standard setting. It is shown that there exists a political equilibrium in which the importing country on average applies a more stringent standard than the exporting country. This difference can be due either to a too lax standard in the exporting country or a too stringent standard in the importing country.

JEL-codes: D72 F13 F18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Product Standards, Trade Disputes and Protectionism (2001)
Working Paper: Product standards, trade disputes and protectionism (2001)
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