Economics at your fingertips  

Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing

Giovanni Facchini (), Johannes Van Biesebroeck () and Gerald Willmann ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 39, issue 3, 845-873

Abstract: explain tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying process. In most empirical implementations of this framework protection is instead measured using non-tariff barriers. Since tariffs allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection, while non-tariff barriers do not, the existing parameter estimates of the protection for sale model are likely to be biased. To address this problem, we augment the framework by considering instruments that allow partial capturing. Our specification is supported by the data, where we find that only 72-75% of the rent from protection is appropriated by the government.

JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing (2003) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ionen/membership.php

Access Statistics for this article

Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Katherine Cuff

More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Werner Antweiler ().

Page updated 2020-01-17
Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:3:p:845-873