Viewpoint: Decision-making in committees

Hao Li and Wing Suen

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 42, issue 2, 359-392

Abstract: This article reviews recent developments in the theory of committee decision-making. A committee consists of self-interested members who make a public decision by aggregating imperfect information dispersed among them according to a pre-specified decision rule. We focus on costly information acquisition, strategic information aggregation, and rules and processes that enhance the quality of the committee decision. Seeming inefficiencies of the committee decision-making process such as over-cautiousness, voting, and delay emerge as partial remedies to these incentive problems.

JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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