Union structure and firms' incentives for cooperative R&D investments
Constantine Manasakis () and
Emmanuel Petrakis ()
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 42, issue 2, 665-693
We investigate the impact of alternative unionization structures on firms' incentives to invest on cost-reducing R&D and to form Research Joint Ventures (RJVs), in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that if firms invest non-cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are higher under centralized rather than under decentralized wage-setting. In contrast, investments are always higher under decentralized wage-setting in the case of RJVs. Firms' incentives to form an RJV are stronger under centralized wage-setting if and only if spillovers are low enough. Finally, centralized wage-setting may hinder the formation of costly RJVs and their potential welfare benefits.
JEL-codes: J51 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Union structure and firms' incentives for cooperative R&D investments (2009)
Working Paper: Union Structure and Firms Incentives for Cooperative R&D Investments (2007)
Working Paper: Union structure and firms incentives for cooperative R&D investments (2004)
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