The political economy of naturalization
Fabio Mariani ()
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 46, issue 2, 656-688
This paper presents a political economy model in which selfinterested natives decide when citizenship and/or voting rights should be granted to foreignborn workers. Native voters know that immigrants hold different political preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible. They also consider, however, that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration. We find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity, quality (productivity), and preferences of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue.
JEL-codes: D72 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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