A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College

Mirabelle Muûls () and Dimitra Petropoulou ()

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 46, issue 2, 705-724

Abstract: This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their reelection probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.

JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College (2008)
Working Paper: A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college (2008)
Working Paper: A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in the Electoral College (2007)
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