 The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accessionCanadian Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 46, issue 4, 1295-1316 Abstract: We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large stateowned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy. JEL-codes: F13 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:46:y:2013:i:4:p:1295-1316 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Canadian Journal of Economics is currently edited by Zhiqi Chen More articles in Canadian Journal of Economics from Canadian Economics Association Canadian Economics Association Prof. Werrner Antweiler, Treasurer UBC Sauder School of Business 2053 Main Mall Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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