Exclusion via Non-Exclusive Contracts

Aggey Semenov and Julian Wright

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2014, vol. 47, issue 1, 325-347

Abstract: We establish that nonlinear vertical contracts can allow an incumbent to exclude an upstream rival in a setting that does not rely on the exclusivity of the incumbent's contracts with downstream firms or any limits on distribution channels available to the incumbent or rival. The optimal contract we describe is a threepart quantity discounting contract that involves the payment of an allowance to a downstream distributor and a marginal wholesale price below the incumbent's marginal cost for sufficiently large quantities. The optimal contract is robust to allowing parties to renegotiate contracts in case of entry.

JEL-codes: C72 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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