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International trade and directed search unemployment in general equilibrium

Ian King and Frank Stähler

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2014, vol. 47, issue 2, 580-604

Abstract: We develop an open economy general equilibrium model, with auctionbased directed search unemployment, to study the interactions of trade and unemployment. The theory ascribes all outcomes purely to the fundamentals of technology and endowment. If countries differ by endowment , trade makes both the unemployment rate and the rental in the capital(labour) abundant country rise (decline) but does not lead to equalization. If, alternatively, countries differ by technology , trade increases (decreases) the unemployment rate in the country whose technology is relatively superior (inferior) for producing the capitalintensive good.

JEL-codes: F16 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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