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The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization

R. Emre Aytimur (), Aristotelis Boukouras and Robert Schwager

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 49, issue 3, 997-1015

Abstract: We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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