Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities?

Kim Nguyen (), Michael Peters and Michel Poitevin

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2017, vol. 50, issue 5, 1573-1594

Abstract: We analyze the academic matching market by considering a simple model in which applicants who face an application cost strategically choose portfolios of applications. Universities then play a decentralized offer game in which unaccepted offers result in failure to trade on both sides of the market. We characterize a basic equilibrium to illustrate the sorting role that application costs play. In a numeric example, we illustrate how reduced application costs can result in increased matching frictions.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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