Peacekeeping: A strategic approach

Max Blouin

Canadian Journal of Economics, 2018, vol. 51, issue 1, 41-63

Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; this strategy results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.

JEL-codes: D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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