 Something Has to Give: Why Delays Are the New Reality of Canada’s Defence Procurement StrategyElinor Sloan
SPP Research Papers, 2014, vol. 7, issue 33 Abstract: Recent waves of political controversy over military procurement programs, most notably the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, are symptoms of an ongoing and increasingly strategic choice Canada is making in the way it equips its military. From the failure to settle on a design for the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (which had an originally planned delivery date of 2013), to the un-awarded contracts for new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft (initially anticipated nearly a decade ago) and the incomplete Integrated Soldier-System Project (once expected to be active by this year); to the delay in cutting the steel for the Joint Support Ship (initial delivery planned for 2012) needed to replace vessels that are now being decommissioned, Canadians are witnessing the results of a new philosophy behind the government’s procurement process. Canadian governments have always insisted on industrial and regional benefits for Canada when buying military equipment. But the massive defence spending promised under the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy exacerbated this approach. The emphasis has now formally been placed on favouring industrial benefits for Canada in defence acquisitions, while heightened political cautiousness has placed a higher priority on ensuring maximum value for taxpayer money with a zero tolerance for mistakes environment. A relatively small Canadian defence budget has put pressure on military officials to be creative about ordering new equipment — in some cases, perhaps too creative. Officials have taken to commissioning vehicles and equipment that are more versatile and are capable of carrying out more than their traditional functions. In certain instances, this has meant wish lists that cannot be fulfilled in the expected time frame, or even at all. This is the case, for example, with the Joint Support Ship, which went from a plan for new refuelling and replenishment ships to one for vessels that could also provide a command and control centre for forces ashore and sealift for ground forces, including space for helicopters on deck, making this ship unique. Another example of where fiscal prudence has resulted in procurement complications is in the Canadian Surface Combatant project: here, the Navy is trying to use a common hull for both frigates and destroyers to generate savings in crewing, training, maintenance and logistics. Often, the demand for more versatility and the need to stretch spending have led to plans for equipment that do not yet exist and are so technologically ambitious that industry cannot deliver what the Canadian government requires, as has happened with the highly problematic Maritime Helicopter Project. Last February the government released a Defence Procurement Strategy with the ambitious goal of maximizing Canadian industrial opportunities while at the same time equipping the Canadian Armed Forces in a timely fashion. But no procurement strategy can achieve these two goals at once: either industrial benefits will be lost as equipment is purchased “off-theshelf”, or the forces will have to wait longer for equipment. The strategy features a rejuvenated form of the industrial and regional benefits policy that runs through most major projects and has been responsible for massive delays due to the requirement to use large teams of local suppliers. Canadians may express a desire to see their soldiers outfitted expeditiously, but doing so would come at a political cost. When tensions inevitably arise between equipping our forces properly, in a timely fashion, and ensuring there are industrial benefits to Canada, the latter priority is destined to come out ahead. Buying equipment off the shelf is always easier, faster and almost certainly cheaper, but the government has made it clear that Canadian industry should receive some share of benefit from investing their tax dollars on defence. This is not just for populist reasons, but to nurture a permanent base of domestic capability, so as to ensure that Canada retains a permanent level of expertise and ability in equipping its own military. The government appears to have decided that delays in the acquisition of military equipment is the price it is willing to pay to preserve to preserve strategically careful procurement. Date: 2014 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clh:resear:v:7:y:2014:i:33a Access Statistics for this article More articles in SPP Research Papers from The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary Contact information at EDIRC. |
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